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An important foreign policy event in the
second half of April was the ratification
of the Agreement Establishing a Common
Economic Area by the legislatures of
Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine.
As agreed by the presidents of these
countries, the CEA has been drafted as 
an economic union, which means
participating countries will pursue a
common economic policy (see Table 1).
At the same time, Russia is looking for
the deepest form of economic
integration, a monetary union in which
the participants will use a common
currency.
Free trade within the CEA would
be convenient for Ukraine
According to ICPS, Ukraine can benefit
from creating a free trade area (FTA) with
Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, but
deeper integration would inflict net
losses on the Ukrainian economy. The
advantages to Ukraine from setting up an
FTA include:
• increased exports to participating
countries, with the most notable
impact being in trade with Russia,
Ukraine’s biggest trade partner.
Primarily, exports of agricultural
commodities, foodstuffs and ferrous
metals, which have the greatest number
of exemptions in the current “free
trade” regime, stand to increase.
However, there is a risk that, even after
the import and export duties are
cancelled in mutual trade, some
countries will continue to launch a
great number of anti0dumping and
special investigations, which would
cancel out any liberalization of tariffs; 
• reduced production costs for Ukrainian
exports, thanks to cheaper imported raw
materials and increased economies of
scale as a result of access to bigger
markets;
•higher competition among the
manufacturers of the four countries will
boost the performance of Ukraine’s
economy. 
Ukraine stands to lose from any
further integration
Deeper, rapid integration among the four
countries will have considerable negative
impact on Ukraine’s economy: 
CUSTOMS UNION. We consider it very
unlikely that the CEA countries will agree
to adopt Ukrainian customs tariffs. This
means that Ukraine will have to redo all
its bilateral agreements on access to
goods and services markets with members
of the Working Group of the World Trade
Organization (WTO). This will
considerably delay that negotiation
process, and Ukraine will be likely to
enjoy the advantages of WTO membership
at a much later date. If the need arises to
raise specific import duty rates, these
agreements will be more complicated to
review. Furthermore, raising new trade
barriers with countries who are not CEA
members will re0orient consumers and
producers towards imports from CEA
countries, where production is less
efficient. As a result, the efficiency of
resource allocation in Ukraine’s economy
will fall.
ECONOMIC UNION. A common economic
policy would essentially require that a
common government be set up, to take
into account the interests of all
participants of the economic union in
formulating policy. However, there is a
significant risk that economic policy in
the CEA will be imposed by the most
influential player, Russia. That is the case
with the Eurasian Economic Association,
where Russia has the right of veto on all
decisions, and where, for the most part,
Russian norms are applied to the other
participants. Under these conditions,
Ukraine will be unable to bring its
economic policy and legislation in line
with EU norms.
MONETARY UNION. Should CEA reject
the notion of a new currency and choose
the Russian ruble as their common
currency—which is in contrast to all
existing currency unions—this could
result in a situation where Russia will
determine the monetary policy of all CEA
participants and enjoy seigniorage.
Moreover, since the economic
development of CEA participants is
uneven, the absence of independent
monetary policy will mean the countries
Ukraine will benefit from the creation of a free trade area within the Common
Economic Area (CEA), but further integration in the form of a customs or
economic union will lead to economic and political damage. Meanwhile, Moscow
is interested in deeper integration, which means establishing a common
currency. Russia will suffer substantial losses from the creation of an FTA. Final
judgement as to the benefits and losses for the Ukrainian economy resulting
from integration will be possible only after additional agreements to the
framework Agreement Establishing of a Common Economic Area are ratified
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Free trade area Participating countries eliminate mutual trade barriers 
Customs union Internal FTA + common external trade barriers  
Common market Customs union + free movement of capital and labor
Economic union Common market + common economic policy
Monetary union Economic union + common currency
Table 1. Stages of economic integration
will have difficulty fighting problems
related to unsynchronized business
cycles. As EU experience shows, laying
down the conditions for transition to a
single currency is a very lengthy process:
the formation of the European Monetary
Union took several decades.
The CEA should cancel CIS0based
trade barriers
The establishment of an FTA is a basic
condition for the CEA. A free trade area
involving CEA participating countries was
already declared within the framework of
an FTA among the CIS countries. It
operates today, albeit with numerous
exceptions. Setting up an FTA under the
CEA seems to imply abolishing all those
barriers.
The biggest number of trade exceptions
are in favor of Russia. Specifically, the
Russian Federation restricts imports of
piping from Ukraine through quotas and
regularly raises duty rates for imports of
zinc0covered rolled metal from Ukraine
and Kazakhstan. In addition, Russia
charges VAT on gas and oil exports. In its
turn, Ukraine limits imports of Russian
automobiles and cement. Mutual trade
barriers among CEA participants also
affect farm commodities and processed
food—in particular, confectionery
products, sugar, spirits, and tobacco
products.
Since the export profile of these
countries is similar, setting up an FTA
within the framework of the CEA should
increase competition in certain key
export sectors—in particular, agricultural
commodities, steel products, machinery
and equipment, and vehicles. At the same
time, the participants’ markets will also
expand.
Not all CEA participants will gain
from an FTA
Assuming that the CEA0based FTA
functions without any barriers, a number
of potential implications for other
participating countries can be predicted:
RUSSIA. Energy resources constitute the
overwhelming majority of Russian exports
to Ukraine and Belarus. This means that
Russia will lose significant budget
revenues if it drops the VAT on energy
exports. Moreover, if energy prices in
Ukraine and Russia become relatively
equal, the production cost of Ukrainian
goods will be lower than that of similar
goods produced in Russia, due to lower
labor costs in Ukraine. As a result,
Russian metalworks and manufacturers of
farm equipment and food products will
suffer the most
KAZAKHSTAN. Kazakh exports to CEA
participants are dominated by mineral
products and grains, while finished
products occupy a larger share of its
imports from participants. Kazakhstan’s
domestic market is limited and, what is
more, huge transport costs create a major
hurdle for the development of trade with
European countries. An FTA would partly
compensate for limited access to those
markets. Kazakhstan will benefit from
market diversification, especially once
restrictions on rolled steel imports to
Russia are dropped. As an energy
supplier, however, Kazakhstan will lose
out.
BELARUS. More than a half of Belarus’s
foreign trade is with Russia, as foreign
trade between the two countries has
developed within the framework of a
customs union since 1996. Given the few
trade restrictions between Belarus and
other CEA participants, a CEA0based FTA
will not have much impact.
Ukraine—beware!
The risk of setting up a CEA0based FTA is
that an upswing in trade within this FTA
will make EU markets seem less
attractive. After all, trading within the
common area will be less problematic
than fighting for European markets. This
threatens to bring with it a certain
isolation from developed EU countries,
which would be intolerable for Ukraine,
particularly in the context of its
aspirations to further European
integration. 
Setting up an FTA within the CEA could
expand the markets of participating
countries and at least partly offset losses
from the closure of European markets.
Nevertheless, given what it stands to lose
from such a move, Russia is highly
unlikely to really drop all its trade
barriers, which Ukraine has been insisting
on during negotiations.
The production cost of Ukrainian goods is
unlikely to change, since the leveling of
energy prices within the CEA is most
likely to happen because other
participants will raise their prices to
Ukrainian levels, which are still way below
world prices. Still, this leveling of energy
prices could offer Ukrainian producers an
opportunity to finance additional
spending to upgrade their technology.
However, they will have few incentives to
do so, if they can continue selling their
products on the undemanding CEA market
even without modernization.
The positive consequences of an FTA will
be dampened by the fact that foreign
direct investments from within the CEA
will bring fewer new technologies and
know0how than those from economically0
developed Western countries. At the same
time, the removal of trade barriers
between Ukraine and Russia alongside a
more favorable investment climate in
Russia could strengthen that country’s
competitive edge in attracting foreign
investment.
For further information, contact Tetiana
Shcherbakova by phone at
(380*44) 236*4477, or via e*mail at
tshcherbakova@icps.kiev.ua.
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Table 2. Foreign trade structure of CEA participants in 2002, %
Share of foreign trade turnover with:
Belarus Kazakhstan Russia Ukraine EU
Belarus – 0 57 3 19
Kazakhstan 0 – 25 3 19
Russia 7 3 – 6 36
Ukraine 2 2 29 – 22
Source: Statistics Agency of the Kazakh Republic, State Customs Committee of the
Russian Federation, Derzhkomstat of Ukraine, Ministry of Statistics and Analysis of the
Republic of Belarus
